The credit crisis and the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis have highlighted the native form of credit risk, namely the counterparty risk. The related Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA), Debt Valuation Adjustment (DVA), Liquidity Valuation Adjustment (LVA) and Replacement Cost (RC) issues, jointly referred to in this paper as Total Valuation Adjustment (TVA), have been thoroughly investigated in the theoretical papers [Cr12a] and [Cr12b] . The present work provides an executive summary and numerical companion to these papers, through which the TVA pricing problem can be reduced to Markovian pre-default TVA BSDEs. The first step consists in the counterparty clean valuation of a portfolio of contracts, which is the valuation in a hypothetical situation where the two parties would be risk-free and funded at a risk-free rate. In the second step, the TVA is obtained as the value of an option on the counterparty clean value process called Contingent Credit Default Swap (CCDS). Numerical results are presented for interest rate swaps in the Vasicek, as well as in the inverse Gaussian Hull-White short rate model, also allowing one to assess the related model risk issue.
Introduction
The credit crisis and the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis have highlighted the native form of credit risk, namely the counterparty risk. This is the risk of non-payment of promised cash-flows due to the default of the counterparty in a bilateral OTC derivative transaction. The basic counterparty risk mitigation tool is a Credit Support Annex (CSA) specifying a valuation scheme of a portfolio of contracts at the default time of a party. In particular, the netting rules which will be applied to the portfolio are specified, as well as a collateralization scheme similar to margin accounts in futures contracts.
By extension counterparty risk is also the volatility of the price of this risk, this price being known as Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA), see [PR05] , [BMP13] , [BBCH13] . Moreover, as banks themselves have become risky, counterparty risk must be understood in a bilateral perspective, where the counterparty risk of the two parties are jointly accounted for in the modeling. Thus, in addition to the CVA, a Debt Valuation Adjustment (DVA) must be considered. In this context the classical assumption of a locally risk-free asset which is used for financing purposes of the bank is not sustainable anymore. This raises the companion issue of proper nonlinear accounting of the funding costs of a position, and a corresponding Liquidity Valuation Adjustment (LVA). The last related issue is that of Replacement Cost (RC) corresponding to the fact that at the default time of a party the contract is valued by the liquidator according to a CSA valuation scheme which can fail to reflect the actual value of the contract at that time.
The CVA/DVA/LVA/RC intricacy issues, jointly referred to henceforth as TVA (for Total Valuation Adjustment), were thoroughly investigated in the theoretical papers [Cr12a] , [Cr12b] , [BCPP11] and [BK11] . The present work is a numerical companion paper to [Cr12a] and [Cr12b] . Section 2 provides an executive summary of the two papers. Section 3 describes various CSA specifications. In Sections 4 and 5 we present clean valuation (clean of counterparty risk and funding costs) and TVA computations in two simple models for interest rate derivatives. We show in a series of practical examples how CVA, DVA, LVA and RC can be computed in various situations, and we also assess the related model risk issue.
TVA Representations

Setup
We consider a netted portfolio of OTC derivatives between two defaultable counterparties, generically referred to as the "contract between the bank and her counterparty". The counterparty is most commonly a bank as well. Counterparty risk and funding cash-flows can only be considered at a netted and global level, outside the scope of different business desks. Consequently, the price Π of the contract must be computed as a difference between the clean price P provided by the relevant business desk and a correction Θ computed by the central TVA desk. By price we mean here the cost for the bank of margining, hedging and funding ("cost of hedging" for short). By clean price we mean the price of the contract computed without taking into account counterparty risk and excess funding costs. Symmetrical considerations apply to the counterparty, but with non-symmetrical data in the sense of hedging positions and funding conditions. As a consequence and due to nonlinearities in the funding costs, the prices (costs of hedging) are not the same for the two parties. For clarity we focus on the bank's price in the sequel.
We denote by T the time horizon of the contract with promised dividends dD t from the bank to her counterparty. Both parties are defaultable, with respective default times denoted by θ and θ. This results in an effective dividend stream dC t = J t dD t , where J t = 1 t<τ with τ = θ ∧ θ. One denotes byτ = τ ∧ T the effective time horizon of the contract as there are no cash-flows afterτ . The case of unilateral counterparty risk (from the perspective of the bank) can be recovered by letting θ ≡ ∞. After having sold the contract to the investor at time 0, the bank sets-up a collateralization, hedging and funding portfolio ("hedging portfolio" for short). We call an external funder of the bank (or funder for short) a generic third-party, possibly composed in practice of several entities or devices, insuring funding of the position of the bank. This funder, assumed default-free for simplicity, thus plays the role of "lender/borrower of last resort" after exhaustion of the internal sources of funding provided to the bank via the dividend and funding gains on her hedge, or via the remuneration of the margin amount.
The full model filtration is given as G = F ∨ H θ ∨ H θ , where F is a reference filtration and H θ t = σ(θ ∧ t), H θ t = σ(θ ∧ t). A probability space (Ω, G T , P), where P is some riskneutral pricing measure, is fixed throughout. The meaning of a risk-neutral pricing measure in this context, with different funding rates in particular (see [Cr12a] ), will be specified by martingale conditions introduced below in the form of suitable pricing backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs); see [EPQ97] for the seminal reference in finance.
Remark 2.1 Even though it will not appear explicitly in this paper, a pricing measure must also be such that the gain processes on the hedging assets follow martingales, see [Cr12a] .
Moreover, we assume that F is immersed into G in the sense that an F-martingale stopped at τ is a G-martingale.
Remark 2.2 As discussed in [Cr12b] , this basic assumption precludes major wrong-way risk effects such as the ones which occur with counterparty risk on credit derivatives. In particular, under these assumptions an F-adapted càdlàg process cannot jump at τ. We refer to [Cr12c] for an extension of the general methodology of this paper beyond the above immersion setup to incorporate wrong-way risk when necessary.
Data
We denote by r t an OIS rate, where OIS stands for an Overnight Indexed Swap, the best market proxy of a risk-free rate. By r t = r t + γ t we denote the credit-risk adjusted rate, where γ t is the F-hazard intensity of τ , which is assumed to exist. Let β t = exp(− t 0 r s ds) and β t = exp(− t 0 r s ds) stand for the corresponding discount factors. Furthermore, IE t and E t stand for the conditional expectations given G t and F t , respectively. The clean value process P t of the contract with promised dividends dD t is defined as, for t ∈ [0,τ ],
by immersion of F into G. Effectively, promised dividends dD t stop being paid at τ (if τ < T ), at which time the last terminal cash-flow R paid by the bank closes out her position. Let an F-adapted process Q represent the (predictable) CSA value process of the contract, and an F-adapted process Γ stand for the value process of a CSA (cash) collateralization scheme. We denote by π a real number meant to represent the wealth of the hedging portfolio of the bank in the financial interpretation. The close-out cash-flow R = R(π) is in fact twofold, decomposing into a close-out cash-flow R i from the bank to the counterparty, minus, in case of default of the bank, a cash-flow R f = R f (π) from the funder to the bank (depending on π). These two cash-flows are respectively derived from the algebraic debt χ of the bank to her counterparty and X(π) of the bank to her funder, modeled at time τ as
(2)
The close-out cash-flow, if τ < T , is then modeled as R(π) = R i − 1 τ =θ R f (π), where
in which ρ and ρ stand for recovery rates between the two parties, and r stands for a recovery rate of the bank to her funder. The G τ -measurable exposure at default is defined in terms of R as
where the second equality follows by an easy algebraic manipulation. We now consider the cash-flows required for funding the bank's position, meant in the sense of the contract and its hedging portfolio altogether. For simplicity we stick to the most common situation where the hedge is self-funded as swapped and/or traded via repo markets (see [Cr12a] ). The OIS rate r t is used as a reference for all other funding rates, which are thus defined in terms of corresponding bases to r t . Given such bases b t andb t related to the collateral posted and received by the bank, and λ t andλ t related to external lending and borrowing, the funding coefficient g t (π) is defined by
Then (r t π + g t (π))dt represents the bank's funding cost over (t, t + dt), depending on its wealth π.
Remark 2.3 A funding basis is typically interpreted as a combination of liquidity and/or credit risk, see [FT11a] and [CD12] . Collateral posted in foreign-currency and switching currency collateral optionalities can also be accounted for by suitable amendments to b and b, see [FST10] and [Pit12] .
BSDEs
With the data ξ and g specified, the TVA process Θ can be implicitly defined on [0,τ ] as the solution to the following BSDE, posed in integral form and over the random time interval [0,τ ]: For t ∈ [0,τ ],
The reader is referred to [Cr12b, Proposition 2.1] for the derivation of the TVA BSDE (6). In this paper for simplicity of presentation we take (6) as the definition of the TVA. The practical conclusion of [Cr12b] is that one can even adopt a simpler "reduced, predefault" perspective in which defaultability of the two parties only shows up through their default intensities, see Proposition 2.4 below and equation (3.8) in [Cr12b] . For t ∈ [0, T ] and π ∈ R let
in which
Note that in case of unilateral counterparty risk, we have θ = ∞ and consequently, p τ = 0, p τ = 1.
Proposition 2.4 (TVA Reduced-Form Representation) One has Θ = Θ on [0,τ ) and Θτ = 1 τ <T ξ, where
Remark 2.5 This assumes that the data of (8) are in F, a mild condition which can always be met be passing to F-representatives (or pre-default values) of the original data.
Remark 2.6 For r = 1 the exposure at default ξ does not depend on π, and in case of a linear funding coefficient given as g t (P − ϑ) = g 0 t (P ) − λ 0 t ϑ, for some g 0 and λ 0 , the TVA equations (6) and (8) respectively boil down to the explicit representations
Here the funding-adjusted discount factors are
and ξ 0 t in (10) is given by
On the numerical side such explicit representations allow one to estimate the corresponding "linear TVAs" by standard Monte Carlo loops provided that P t and Q t can be computed explicitly. In general (for example as soon as r < 1), nonlinear TVA computations can only be done by more advanced schemes involving linearization [FT11b] , nonlinear regression [CAC + 10] or branching particles [HL12] . Deterministic schemes for the corresponding semilinear TVA PDEs can only be used in low dimension.
In differential form the pre-default TVA BSDE (8) reads as follows (cf. [Cr12b, Definition 3.1]) Θ T = 0, and for t ∈ [0, T ] :
where µ is the F-martingale component of Θ and
Remark 2.7 From (1), P satisfies the following F-BSDE P T = 0, and for t ∈ [0, T ] :
for some F-martingale M . Therefore, the following pre-default F-BSDE in Π := P − Θ follows from (11) and (13):
   Π T = 0, and for t ∈ [0, T ] :
where
As the pre-default price BSDE (14) involves the contractual promised cash-flows dD t , it is less user-friendly than the pre-default TVA BSDE (11). This mathematical incentive comes on top of the financial justification recalled at the beginning of Section 2 for adopting a two-stage "clean price P minus TVA correction Θ" approach to the counterparty risk and funding issues.
Pre-default Markov Setup
Assume
for some deterministic function g(t, x, θ), and an R d -valued F-Markov pre-default factor process X. Then Θ t = Θ(t, X t ), where the pre-default TVA pricing function Θ(t, x) is the solution to the following pre-default pricing PDE:
in which X stands for the infinitesimal generator of X. As mentioned in Remark 2.6, from the point of view of numerical solution, deterministic PDE schemes for (16) can be used provided the dimension of X is less than 3 or 4, otherwise simulation schemes for (11) are the only viable alternative.
CVA, DVA, LVA and RC
Plugging (7) into (12) and reordering terms yields
where the coefficient λ t :=λ t − γ t p t (1 − r) of (P t − ϑ − Γ t ) − in the third line can be interpreted as an external borrowing basis net of credit spread. This coefficient represents the liquidity component ofλ. From the perspective of the bank, the four terms in this decomposition of the TVA Θ can respectively be interpreted as a costly (non-algebraic, strict) credit value adjustment (CVA), a beneficial debt value adjustment (DVA), a liquidity funding benefit/cost (LVA), and a replacement benefit/cost (RC). In particular, the time-0 TVA can be represented as
The DVA and the γ t p t (1 − r)(P t − Θ t − Γ t ) − -component of the LVA can be considered as "deal facilitating" as they increase the TVA and therefore decrease the price (cost of the hedge) the bank can consider selling the contract to her counterparty. Conversely, the CVA and theλ t (P t − Θ t − Γ t ) − components of the LVA (forλ t positive) can be considered as "deal hindering" as they decrease the TVA and therefore increase the price (cost of the hedge) for the bank. The remaining terms can be interpreted likewise as "deal facilitating or hindering" depending on their sign, which is unspecified in general.
CSA Specifications
In the next subsections we detail various specifications of the general form (17) of g, depending on the CSA data: the close-out valuation scheme Q, the collateralization scheme Γ and the collateral remuneration bases b andb.
Clean CSA Recovery Scheme
In case of a clean CSA recovery scheme Q = P , (17) rewrites as follows:
Note r t on the left-hand side as opposed to r t in (17). In case of no collateralization, i.e. for Γ = 0, the right-hand-side of (19) reduces to
whereas in case of continuous collateralization with Γ = Q = P , it boils down to
Remark 3.1 If λ = λ (case of equal external borrowing and lending liquidity bases), the TVA is linear for every collateralization scheme of the form P t −Γ t = ε t , for some exogenous 1 residual exposure ε t , cf. Remark 2.6. Setting
one ends up, similarly to (10), with
for the funding-adjusted discount factor
3.2 Pre-Default CSA Recovery Scheme
In case of a pre-default CSA recovery scheme Q = Π = P − Θ, (17) rewrites as follows
In case of no collateralization, i.e. for Γ = 0, the right-hand-side reduces to
whereas the continuous collateralization with Γ = Q = P − Θ yields
Remark 3.2 If b =b (case of equal collateral borrowing and lending liquidity bases), the TVA is linear for every collateralization scheme of the form P t − Θ t − Γ t = ε t , for some exogenous 2 residual exposure ε t , cf. Remark 2.6. Setting
one ends up, again similarly to (10), with
Remark 3.3 If b =b = 0, the two continuous collateralization schemes of equations (21)) and (27) equally collapse to Θ = 0 and Π = P = Γ = Q.
Full Collateralization CSA
Let us define the full collateralization CSA by Q = Γ * where Γ * is given as the solution to the following F-BSDE:
for some F-martingale µ * . Then Θ := P − Γ * solves the pre-default TVA BSDE (11), or in other words Π = Γ * . Indeed one has by (17), that for t ∈ [0, T ]
Therefore, the second line of (31) reads as
which, together with the fact that P − Γ * vanishes at T , means that P − Γ * satisfies the pre-default TVA BSDE (11). If b =b, then g t ( Π t ) + r t P t reduces to (r t + b t ) Π t in the BSDE (14) for the fully collateralized price Π = Γ * . This BSDE is thus equivalent to the following explicit expression for Π:
where the funding-adjusted discount factor β b is defined by (30). In the special case b = b = 0, we have Γ * = P which is the situation already considered in Remark 3.3. This case, which yields Θ = 0 and Π = P = Q = Γ, justifies the status of formula (1) as the master clean valuation formula of a fully collateralized price at an OIS collateral funding rate r t . With such a fully collateralized CSA there is no need for pricing-and-hedging a (null) TVA. The problem boils down to the computation of a clean price P and a related hedge, see e.g. [Cr12b] for possible clean hedge specifications.
Pure Funding
In case γ = 0, which is a no counterparty risk, pure funding issue case, the CSA value process Q plays no actual role. In particular the dt-coefficient of the BSDE (14) for Π is given by
where λ =λ is a pure liquidity external borrowing basis. In case Γ = 0 and λ = λ this results in the following explicit expression of Π:
with the funding-adjusted discount factor β λ defined in (24). In the special case λ =λ = 0 one recovers the classical valuation formula (1) for Π = P .
Asymmetrical TVA Approach
In practice the bank can hardly hedge her jump-to-default and therefore cannot monetize and benefit from her default unless and before it actually happens). If one wants to acknowledge this, one can avoid to reckon any actual benefit of the bank from her own default by letting ρ = r = 1, cf. (4). Such an asymmetrical TVA approach, even though still bilateral, allows one to avoid many concerns of a general symmetrical TVA approach, such as the arbitrage issue that arises for r < 1, the hypothetical and paradoxical benefit of the bank at her own default time, and the puzzle for the bank of having to hedge her own jump-to-default risk in order to monetize this benefit before her default (see [Cr12a] and [Cr12b] )). Indeed in this case equation (17) reduces to
where there is no beneficial debt valuation adjustment anymore (for ρ = 1 the second line of (17) vanishes), and where the borrowing funding basisλ t is interpreted as a pure liquidity cost.
Note that in case of a pre-default CSA recovery scheme Q = Π − = P − Θ − , an asymmetrical (but still bilateral) TVA approach is equivalent to a unilateral TVA approach where the bank would simply disregard her own credit risk. One has in both cases
where γp is the intensity of default of the counterparty. Moreover, in an asymmetrical TVA approach with Q = Π − , an inspection of the related equations in [Cr12b] shows that a perfect TVA hedge by the bank of an isolated default of her counterparty (obtained as the solution to the last equation in [Cr12b] ) in fact yields a perfect hedge of the TVA jump-todefault risk altogether (default of the counterparty and/or the bank). This holds at least provided that the hedging instrument which is used for that purpose (typically a clean CDS on the counterparty) does not jump in value at an isolated default time of the bank, a mild condition 3 satisfied in most models.
Clean Valuations
In the numerical Section 5, we shall resort to two univariate short rate models, presented in Subsections 4.2 and 4.3, for TVA computations on an interest rate swap. These are Markovian pre-default TVA models in the sense of Subsection 2.3.1, with factor process X t = r t . Our motivation for considering two different models is twofold. Firstly, we want to emphasize the fact that from an implementation point of view, the BSDE schemes that we use for TVA computations are quite model-independent (at least the backward nonlinear regression stage, after a forward simulation of the model in a first stage). Secondly, this allows one to assess the TVA model risk.
Remark 4.1 The choice of interest rate derivatives for the illustrative purpose of this paper is not innocuous. The basic credit risk reduced-form methodology of this paper is suitable for situations of reasonable dependence between the reference contract and the two parties (reasonable or unknown, e.g. the dependence between interest rates and credit is not liquidly priced on the market, see [BP08] ). For cases of strong dependence such as counterparty risk on credit derivatives, the additional tools of [Cr12c] are necessary. Talking about interest rate derivatives, one should also mention the systemic counterparty risk, referring to various significant spreads which emerged since August 2007 between quantities that were very similar before, like OIS swap rates and LIBOR swap rates of different tenors. Through its discounting implications, this systemic component of counterparty risk has impacted all derivative markets. This means that in the current market conditions, one should actually use multiple-curve clean value models of interest rate derivatives in the TVA computations (see for instance [CGN12] and the references therein). In order not to blur the main flow of argument we postpone this to a follow-up work.
Products
In the sequel we shall deal with the following interest rate derivatives: forward rate agreements (FRAs), IR swaps and caps, whose definitions we provide below. The latter are used in Section 5 for calibration purposes. The underlying rate for all these derivatives is the LIBOR rate. We work under the usual convention that the LIBOR rate is set in advance and the payments are made in arrears. As pointed out in Remark 4.1, we do not tackle here the multiple-curve issue. Thus, we use the classical definition of the forward LIBOR rate L t (T, T + δ), fixed at time t ≤ T , for the future time interval [T, T + δ]:
where B · (T ) denotes the time-t price of a zero coupon bond with maturity T .
Definition 4.2 A forward rate agreement (FRA) is a financial contract which fixes the interest rate K which will be applied to a future time interval. Denote by T > 0 the future inception date, by T + δ the maturity of the contract, where δ ≥ 0, and by N the notional amount. The payoff of the FRA at maturity T + δ is equal to
The value at time t ∈ [0, T ] of the FRA is given by
whereK = 1 + δK.
Definition 4.3 An interest rate (IR) swap is a financial contract between two parties to exchange one stream of future interest payments for another, based on a specified notional amount N . A fixed-for-floating swap is a swap in which fixed payments are exchanged for floating payments linked to the LIBOR rate. Denote by T 0 ≥ 0 the inception date, by T 1 < · · · < T n , where T 1 > T 0 , a collection of the payment dates and by K the fixed rate. Under our sign convention recalled in Section 2 that the clean price values promised dividends dD t from the bank to her counterparty, the time-t clean price of the swap P t for the bank when it pays the floating rate (case of the so-called receiver swap for the bank) is given by
where t ≤ T 0 and δ k−1 = T k − T k−1 . The swap rate K t , i.e. the fixed rate K making the value of the swap at time t equal to zero is given by
The value of the swap from initiation onward, i.e. the time-t value, for T 0 ≤ t < T n , of the swap is given by
where T kt is the smallest T k (strictly) greater than t. If the bank pays the fixed rate in the swap (case of the so-called payer swap from the bank's perspective), then the corresponding clean priceP t is given byP t = −P sw (t; T 1 , T n ).
Definition 4.4 An interest rate cap (respectively floor) is a financial contract in which the buyer receives payments at the end of each period in which the interest rate exceeds (respectively falls below) a mutually agreed strike. The payment that the seller has to make covers exactly the difference between the strike K and the interest rate at the end of each period. Every cap (respectively floor) is a series of caplets (respectively floorlets). The payoff of a caplet with strike K and exercise date T , which is settled in arrears, is given by
The time-t price of a caplet with strike K and maturity T is given by, withK = 1 + δK,
The next-to-last equality is due to the fact that the payoff
The last equality is obtained by changing from the forward measure IP T to the spot martingale measure IP, cf. [MR05, Definition 9.6.2]. The above equalities say that a caplet can be seen as a put option on a zero coupon bond.
In the two models considered in the next subsections, the counterparty clean price P of an interest rate derivative satisfies, as required for (15),
for all vanilla interest rate derivatives including IR swaps, caps/floors and swaptions.
Gaussian Vasicek short rate model
In the Vasicek model the evolution of the short rate r is described by the following SDE
where a, k > 0 and W σ is a Brownian motion with volatility σ > 0 on the filtered probability space (Ω, G T , F, P). The unique solution to this SDE is given by
The zero coupon bond price B t (T ) in this model can be written as an exponential-affine function of the current level of the short rate r. One has
2a 2 , and
The clean price P for FRAs and interest rate swaps can be written as
inserting the expression (41) for the bond price B t (T ) into equations (35), (36) and (38) from Definitions 4.2 and 4.3.
In particular, the time-t price, for T 0 ≤ t < T n , of the interest rate swap is given by
which follows from (38) and (41). In the above equation m va (t, T k ) and n va (t, T k ) are given by (42) and (43).
Caplet
To price a caplet at time 0 in the Vasicek model, one uses (39) with
for m va (T, T +δ) and n va (T, T +δ) given by (42) and (43). Combining this with Proposition 11.3.1 and the formula on the bottom of page 354 in [MR05] yields (recallK = 1 + δK):
where Φ is the Gaussian distribution function and
Lévy Hull-White short rate model
In this section we recall a one-dimensional Lévy Hull-White model obtained within the HJM framework. Contrary to the Vasicek model, this model fits automatically the initial bond term structure B 0 (T ). As in Example 3.5 of [CGN12] , we consider the Lévy Hull-White extended Vasicek model for the short rate r given by
where α > 0 and Z ς denotes a Lévy process described below. Furthermore,
where f 0 (t) = −∂ t log B 0 (t) and ψ ς denotes the cumulant function of Z ς ; see [CGN12, Example 3.5] with the volatility specification σ s (T ) = e −α(T −s) , 0 ≤ s ≤ T , therein.
In this paper we shall use an inverse Gaussian (IG) process Z ς = (Z ς t ) t≥0 , which is a pure-jump, infinite activity, subordinator (nonnegative Lévy process), providing an explicit control on the sign of the short rates (see [CGN12] ). The IG process is obtained from a standard Brownian motion W by setting
where ς > 0. Its Lévy measure is given by
The distribution of Z 2 ] since F ς is concentrated on (0, ∞)) and is given by
Similarly to the Gaussian Vasicek model, the bond price B t (T ) in the Lévy Hull-White short rate model can be written as an exponential-affine function of the current level of the short rate r:
In the Lévy Hull-White model the clean price P for FRAs and interest rate swaps can be written as
by combining the exponential-affine representation (50) of the bond price B t (T ) and Definitions 4.2 and 4.3. In particular, the time-t price, for T 0 ≤ t < T n , of the swap is given by
which follows from (38) and (50). In the above equations m le (t, T k ) and n le (t, T k ) are given by (51) and (52).
Caplet
To calculate the price of a caplet at time 0 in the Lévy Hull-White model, one can replacē B * with B,Σ * with Σ,Ā * with A, and insert Σ * = 0 and A * = 0 in Subsection 4.4 of [CGN12] , thus obtaining the time-0 price of the caplet
where Σ s (t) = 1 α 1 − e −α(t−s) and A s (t) = ψ ς (−Σ s (t)), for 0 ≤ s ≤ t. The time-0 price of the caplet is now given by (cf. [CGN12, Proposition 4.5])
for z ∈ C such that the above expectation is finite. Alternatively, the time-0 price of the caplet can be computed as the following expectation (cf. formula (39))
where r is given by (47) and B T (T + δ) by (50).
Numerics
In Section 5 we shall present TVA computations on an interest rate swap with ten years maturity, where the bank exchanges the swap rate K against a floating LIBOR at the end of each year 1 to 10. In order to fairly assess the TVA model risk issue, this will be done in the Vasicek model and the Lévy Hull-White model calibrated to the same data, in the sense that they share a common initial zero-bond term structure B * 0 (T ) below, and produce the same price for the cap with payments at years 1 to 10 struck at K (hence there is the same level of Black implied volatility in both models at the strike level K). Specifically, we set r 0 = 2% and the following Vasicek parameters: a = 0.25 , k = 0.05 , σ = 0.004 with related zero-coupon rates and discount factors denoted by R * 0 (T ) and B * 0 (T ) = exp(−T R * 0 (T )). It follows from (41) and after some simple calculations,
An application of formula (37) at time 0 yields for the corresponding swap rate the value K = 3.8859%. We choose a swap notional of N = 310.136066$ so that the fixed leg of the swap is worth 100$ at inception. In the Lévy Hull-White model we use α = a = 0.25 (same speed of mean-reversion as in the Vasicek model), an initial bond term-structure B 0 (T ) fitted to B * 0 (T ) by using f 0 (T ) = f * 0 (T ) above in (48), and a value of ς = 17.570728 calibrated to the price in the above Vasicek model of the cap with payments at years 1 to 10 struck at K. The calibration is done by least square minimization based on the explicit formulas for caps in both models reviewed in Subsections 4.2.1 and 4.3.1. After calibration the price of the cap in both models is 20.161$ (for the above notional N yielding a value of 100$ for the fixed leg of the swap).
The top panels of Figure 1 show 20 paths, expectations and 2.5/97.5-percentiles over 10000 paths, simulated in the two models by an Euler scheme r for the short-rate r on a uniform time grid with 200 time steps over [0, 10]yrs. Note one does not see the jumps on the right panel because we used interpolation between the points so that one can identify better the twenty paths. The top panels of Figure 2 show the initial zero-coupon rates term structure R * 0 (T ) and the corresponding forward curves f * 0 (T ), whilst the corresponding discount factors B * 0 (T ) can be seen on the lower left panel. This displays an increasing term structure of interest rates, meaning that the bank will on average be out-of-the-money with a positive P t = P sw t in (38), or in-the-money with a negativeP t = −P sw t , depending on whether the bank pays floating (case of a receiver swap) or fixed rate (case of a payer swap) in the swap, see the bottom panels of Figure 1 . Note that the swap price processes have quite distinct profiles in the two models even though these are co-calibrated. The bottom right panel of Figure  2 shows the Lévy Hull-White mean-reversion function κ(t) corresponding to f * 0 (T ) through (48). 
TVA Computations
In this section we show with practical examples how the CVA, DVA, LVA and RC terms defined in Section 2 can be computed for various CSA specifications of the coefficient g in Section 3. The computation are done for an IR swap in the two models of Section 4.
TVA Equations
The generator X of the Gaussian Vasicek short rate r in the pre-default pricing PDE (16) is given by
Assuming (15), the corresponding TVA Markovian BSDE writes: Θ(T, r T ) = 0, and for t ∈ [0, T ] :
Similarly, the generator X of the Lévy Hull-White short rate r driven by an IG process is given by
where F ς stands for the Lévy measure of Z ς . 4 Assuming (15), the corresponding TVA Markovian BSDE writes: Θ(T, r T ) = 0, and for t ∈ [0, T ] :
where N ς stands for the compensated jump measure of Z ς .
BSDE Scheme
Even though finding deterministic solutions of the corresponding PDEs would be possible in the above univariate setups, in this paper we nevertheless favor BSDE schemes, as they are more generic -in real-life higher-dimensional applications deterministic schemes cannot be used anymore. We solve (57) and (58) 
for the time-step h = T n = 0.02y (one week, roughly). The conditional expectations in space at every time-step are computed by a q-nearest neighbor average non-parametric regression estimate (see, e.g., [HTF09] ), with q = 5 in our numerical experiments below.
Numerics
We set the following TVA parameters: γ = 10%, b =b = λ = 1.5%,λ = 4.5%, p = 50%, p = 70% and we consider five possible CSA specifications in this order:
(r, ρ,ρ) = (40, 40, 40)%, Q = P, Γ = 0 (r, ρ,ρ) = (100, 40, 40)%, Q = P, Γ = 0 (r, ρ,ρ) = (100, 100, 40)%, Q = P, Γ = 0 (r, ρ,ρ) = (100, 100, 40)%, Q = Π, Γ = 0 (r, ρ,ρ) = (100, 40, 40)%, Q = P, Γ = Q = P.
Note that under the first CSA specification, one has λ = 4.5%−0.6×0.5×10% = 1.5% = λ, so this is a linear TVA special case of Remark 3.1, where the TVA at time 0 can be computed through a straight Monte Carlo simulation. Moreover, we shall study the TVA in the two co-calibrated Vasicek and Lévy models, and for the receiver and payer swaps. We thus consider twenty cases (5 CSA specifications × 2 models × receiver versus payer swap). Table 1 shows the time-0 TVAs and the corresponding CVA/DVA/LVA/RC decompositions (four terms on the right-hand side of (18)) in each of the twenty cases. For benchmarking the numerical BSDE results we display in Figure 3 the time-0 TVA BSDE value versus the TVA Monte Carlo mid-and 95%-lower and upper bounds in the first CSA specification (linear). In all four cases the BSDE time-0 value of the TVA is close to the middle of the confidence interval. Table 1 are fully consistent with the CVA/DVA/LVA/RC interpretation of the four terms in the TVA decomposition on the right-hand side of (18), given the increasing term structure of the data discussed in Subsection 4.4. For instance, a "high" DVA of 1.75 in the Vasicek model and 2.34 in the Lévy model for the receiver swap in the first row of Table 1 , is consistent with the fact that with an increasing term structure of rates, the bank is on average out-of-the-money on the receiver swap with a positive P t = P sw t (see Figure 1) . The CVA, on the contrary, is moderate, as it should be for a receiver swap in an increasing term structure of interest rates, and higher ("more negative") in the Lévy than in the Vasicek model (-0.90 versus -0.06). The numbers of Table 1 are not negligible at all in view of the initial value of 100$ of the fixed leg of the swap. In particular, the LVA terms are quite significant in case of the payer swap with r and/or ρ = 100%, see the corresponding terms in rows 3 and 4 in the two bottom parts of Table 1 . The choice of r and ρ thus has tangible operational consequences, in regard of the "deal facilitating"("deal hindering") interpretation of the positive (negative) TVA terms as explained at the end of Subsection 2.4. It is worthwhile noting that all this happens in a simplistic toy model of TVA, in which credit risk is independent from interest rates. These numbers could be even much higher (in absolute value) in a model accounting for potential wrong way risk dependence effects between interest rates and credit risk, see Remark 4.1. 
Conclusion
In this paper, which is a numerical companion to [Cr12a] and [Cr12b] , we show on the standing example of an interest-rate swap how CVA, DVA, LVA and RC, the four "wings" (or pillars) of the TVA, can be computed for various CSA and model specifications. Positive terms such as the DVA (resp. negative terms such as the CVA) can be considered as "deal facilitating" (resp. "deal hindering") as they increase (resp. decrease) the TVA and therefore decrease (resp. increase) the price (cost of the hedge) for the bank. Beliefs regarding the tangibility of a benefit-at-own-default, which depends in reality on the ability to hedge and therefore monetize this benefit before the actual default, are controlled by the choice of the "own recovery-rate" parameters ρ and r. Larger ρ and r mean smaller DVA and LVA and therefore smaller TVA, which in principle means less deals (or a recognition of a higher cost of the deal). This is illustrated numerically in two alternative short rate models to emphasize the model-free feature of the numerical TVA computations through nonlinear regression BSDE schemes. The results show that the TVA model risk is under reasonable control for both co-calibrated models (models calibrated to the same initial term structure, but also with the same level of volatility as imposed through calibration to cap prices). We emphasize however that the latter observation applies to the "standard" case studied in this paper without dominant wrong-way and gap risks, two important features which will be dealt with in future work.
